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Getting Left Behind: The Impact of the
1986 Immigration Reform and Control
Act Amnesty Program on Single
Women With Children
By DIANE M. BESSETrE*
Member of the Class of 1990
"No se quede atrs."
The tag line splashed on bus posters and in newspaper advertise-
ments during March and April of 1988 was a simple admonishment:
"Don't be left behind."' The advertisements printed and distributed by
the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) presumably were
meant to encourage potential applicants to apply for amnesty under the
1986 Immigration Reform and Control Act (IRCA)2 before the May 4,
1988, deadline.
This simple message was ironic considering the realities of the
IRCA amnesty program. The regulations promulgated by the INS on
public charge exclusions actually leave many behind.' Some are left be-
hind because the INS regulations prevent potential applicants from quali-
fying or even applying for amnesty.' Other undocumented people, who
have applied and qualified for amnesty, now find themselves economi-
* This note is dedicated to Frances Martinez, Director of the Legalization Program of
Catholic Community Services in Sacramento, California and an advocate for immigrant's
rights for more than fifteen years.
Thanks to Elizabeth Blakeway and David Perez for their support when we worked to-
gether in the Legalization Program. Thanks also to Beth Zacovic Nevins, Pauline Gee, Ron
Silberstein, and Dana McRae for their comments in reading various drafts of this note.
1. The English translation of "no se quede atris" is "don't be left behind."
2. Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-603, 1986 U.S. CODE
CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS (100 Stat.) 3359 (codified in scattered sections of 8 U.S.C.) [hereinaf-
ter IRCA].
3. The Immigration and Nationality Act has historically included a provision excluding
aliens who are likely to rely on the receipt of public assistance for their subsistence from ob-
taining residency in the United States. Immigration and Nationality Act, Pub. L. No. 52-414,
§§ 212(a)(8), (15), 66 Stat. 163 (codified at 8 U.S.C. §§ 1182(a)(8), (15) (1988)) [hereinafter
INA].
4. See infra notes 95-119 and accompanying text.
Hastings Int'l & Comp. L. Rev.
cally left behind because of a statutory five year ban on the receipt of
public assistance.'
Congress enacted the IRCA in 1986 primarily to control illegal im-
migration by imposing sanctions against employers who hire undocu-
mented workers.6  The amnesty program was created to give
undocumented immigrants with six years of continuous residency or em-
ployment in agricultural labor an opportunity to legalize their immigra-
tion status.7 This Note focuses on the largest group of applicants,
"legalization" applicants, who must prove they have lived continuously
in the United States since before January 1, 1982, in addition to fulfilling
other requirements of the statute.
Single women with children comprise a large portion of the legaliza-
tion applicants.9 Approximately thirty percent of all undocumented per-
sons"° live at or below the poverty income guidelines established by the
federal government."1 Nationwide, families headed by single women
comprise almost ninety percent of the people who receive Aid to Families
with Dependent Children (AFDC).12 These statistics support an infer-
ence that single, undocumented women with children, including
thousands of women who otherwise qualify for the amnesty program,
may be denied amnesty or may have been discouraged from applying
because of the public charge exclusion regulations promulgated by the
INS.
In April 1988 San Mateo County Legal Aid and California Rural
Legal Assistance (CRLA) filed Zambrano v. INS, a class action suit on
5. INA, supra note 3, § 245A(h), amended by IRCA, supra note 2, § 201(a) (codified as
amended at 8 U.S.C. § 1255a(h) (1988)).
6. INA, supra note 3, § 274(a), amended by IRCA, supra note 2, § 101(a) (codified as
amended at 8 U.S.C. § 1324(a) (1988)).
7. INA, supra note 3, § 245(a) (codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1255(a) (1986)); INA, supra note
3, § 210, amended by IRCA, supra note 2, § 302(a) (codified as amended at 8 U.S.C. § 1160
(1988)).
8. INA, supra note 3, § 245A, amended by IRCA, supra note 2, § 201(a) (codified as
amended at 8 U.S.C. § 1255(a)(2)(A) (1988)).
9. Plaintiffs' Complaint at 20, Zambrano v. INS, Civ. No. S-88-455 EJG-EM (E.D. Cal.
Apr. 12, 1988) [hereinafter Plaintiffs' Complaint].
10. Many members of the immigration rights community prefer the term "undocumented
person" to "illegal alien," the term often used by the government. The term "undocumented
person" is perceived as more humane and indicative that no human being can be illegal.
11. Wheeler & Zacovic, The Public Charge Ground of Exclusion for Legalization Appli-
cants, [64 No. 35] INTERPRETER RELEASES 1046 (Sept. 14, 1987) (citing Rumbaut, The Poli-
tics of Migrant Health Care: A Comparative Study of Mexican Immigrants and Indochinese
Refugees, in 7 RESEARCH IN THE SOCIOLOGY OF HEALTH CARE 13 (Wertz ed. 1987)).
12. U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., CHARACTERISTICS AND FINANCIAL CIR-
CUMSTANCES OF AFDC RECIPIENTS (1986). Although undocumented aliens cannot receive
AFDC, their United States citizen children can.
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behalf of potential applicants adversely affected by these regulations. 3
Of the six named plaintiffs, five are single women with children. 4 On
July 31, 1988, United States District Court Judge Edward J. Garcia is-
sued an order granting relief to the plaintiffs. 5 Judge Garcia found that
the INS's Proof of Financial Responsibility [hereinafter PFR] regula-
tions16 violate the IRCA by failing to incorporate the traditional prospec-
tive test for determining whether an undocumented person is likely to
become a public charge.' 7 He also found that the regulations were more
restrictive than the statute: "1) they apply a retrospective test rather than
a prospective test; 2) they attribute public cash assistance provided to
family members to the applicant; and 3) they require applicants to apply
for a waiver before applying the special rule embodied in the statute."' 8
Judge Garcia rejected the contention of the INS that its clarification
memoranda and decision in December 1988 to change the regulations
made the issue moot."' The court noted that the INS did not address
either the situations of applicants who applied before the regulatory
changes were made, or of the class of potential applicants who failed to
apply because they had relied on the challenged regulations.20
The order permanently enjoins the INS from applying the PFR reg-
ulations to all legalization applications. 21 It also requires the INS to no-
tify all individuals who reside in the jurisdiction whose applications were
denied or recommended for denial based on the PFR regulations that
they may be eligible to apply now. 22 Judge Garcia also required the INS
to accept applications from potential applicants who were discouraged
from filing applications and to work with the plaintiffs' attorneys to es-
tablish evidentiary guidelines to prove that these applicants received in-
formation that led them to believe that they were ineligible.23 Finally,
the court ordered the INS to report the provisions of the order and the
proper standards for public charge exclusion cases to all INS district of-
13. Plaintiffs' Complaint, supra note 9.
14. The named plaintiffs are: Marta Zambrano, Margarita Rodriguez, Graciela Lopez,
Andrea Ruiz, Martha Ozuna, and Jorge Perdomo.
15. Order Granting Plaintiffs' Motions for Partial Summary Judgment, Permanent In-
junction and Redefinition of Class, Zambrano v. INS, Civ. No. S-88-455 EJG-EM (E.D. Cal.
July 31, 1989) [hereinafter Order of July 31, 1989].
16. See infra notes 66-92 and accompanying text for a description of the regulations.
17. Order of July 31, 1989, supra note 15, at 5.
18. Id.
19. Id. at 5-7.
20. Id. at 7.
21. Id. at 17.
22. Id. at 18.
23. Id. at 20.
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fices, Qualified Designated Entities [hereinafter QDEs],24 community, so-
cial, and immigrants' rights organizations, and the media.25 The United
States Attorney has appealed the district court decision to the United
States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit.26
This Note focuses on the public charge exclusion regulations
promulgated by the INS. In particular, this Note explores how the INS
exceeded its statutory authority in promulgating overly restrictive regu-
lations and how these regulations violate the Equal Protection Clause of
the United States Constitution as well as international human rights trea-
ties and customary international law.
Section one focuses on the experiences of one individual, a single
woman with four children, and how she overcame the public charge ex-
clusion. Her story illustrates the problems faced by thousands of other
undocumented single women with children as they attempt to legalize
their status in the United States and continue to provide for their
families.
Section two gives an historical overview of the IRCA and the public
charge exclusion of the Immigration and Naturalization Act (INA). Sec-
tion three discusses how the INS has misinterpreted congressional intent
and exceeded its statutory authority by promulgating regulations that ad-
versely affect thousands of applicants and potential applicants, particu-
larly single women with children. The section then portrays three classes
of people affected by the INS regulations. The first two classes are people
who did not qualify for amnesty under the initial program because of
their past receipt of public assistance or because the general confusion
about the meaning of the public charge exclusion regulations discouraged
them from applying. The third group is composed of people who did
24. QDEs are community and immigrants' rights organizations authorized by the INS to
provide quasi-official assistance to IRCA amnesty applicants. IRCA, supra note 2, § 201(a)
(codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1255a(c)(2) (1988)).
25. Order of July 31, 1989, supra note 15, at 22-23.
26. Since the appeal was filed, Judge Garcia has also ruled on two Plaintiffs' motions. On
December 11, 1989, Judge Garcia found the INS in contempt for refusing to process the appli-
cations of people who were discouraged from applying and now wanted to apply for amnesty.
Judge Garcia also held that the INS may limit applicants to people who were discouraged
from applying based on their receipt of cash public assistance, such as AFDC and General
Assistance. The INS may deny applications from people who were discouraged from applying
due to their receipt of non-cash public assistance, such as food stamps. Order Granting in Part
and Denying in Part Plaintiffs' Motion for Contempt, Zambrano v. INS, Civ. No. S-88-455
EJG-EM (E.D. Cal. Dec. 11, 1989). Plaintiffs appealed but were denied reconsideration.
Judge Garcia also refused to extend the deadline more than six months. Order Denying Plain-
tiffs' Motion for Reconsideration, Zambrano v. INS, Civ. No. S-88-455 EJG-EM (E.D. Cal.
Jan. 12, 1990). These orders have been appealed and cross-appealed to the Ninth Circuit.
Notice of Appeal, Zambrano v. INS, No. 89-16014 (9th Cir. Feb. 7, 1990); id. (Mar. 8, 1990).
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qualify for the first stage of the amnesty program but still face obstacles
in attaining permanent lawful residency status.
Section four argues that the public charge exclusion, as interpreted
by the INS, violates the Equal Protection Clause of the United States
Constitution and international law by its de facto discrimination against
single women with children.
This Note concludes with a proposal for correcting the misinterpre-
tations of the IRCA by the INS and for establishing regulations that will
address the intentions of Congress and give single women with children
an equal opportunity to achieve immigration amnesty and realize their
dreams and hopes for economic freedom and human dignity.
I. ONE WOMAN'S STORY-ALICIA ALVARADO
Alicia Alvarado2 7 is typical of women who apply for amnesty under
the IRCA program. Alicia qualified for the first stage of amnesty, but
she still faces severe economic and immigration problems. In this section
of the Note, I relate my experiences with Alicia.2 8
I first met Alicia Alvarado in June 1987 at the Hispanic Apostalate
in Sacramento, California. I was a legalization counselor29 for Catholic
Community Services, and Alicia came to the Apostalate to apply for
legalization.
Alicia is a single mother with four children, all under ten. Her
United States citizen children had been receiving AFDC off and on for a
number of years. At the time, our organization had heard that receipt of
AFDC by United States citizen children could be imputed to their par-
ents applying for IRCA amnesty, so we told all amnesty applicants with
27. Alicia's name has been changed to protect her privacy. She was one of my clients at
the Legalization Program of Catholic Community Services in Sacramento, California during
the summer of 1987.
28. In this section, I use the "female voice" storytelling style propounded in recent law
review articles on feminist legal theory. West, Jurisprudence and Gender, 55 U. CHI. L. REV.
1, 63-72 (1988); Note, Overshooting The Target: A Feminist Deconstruction Of Legal Educa-
tion, 34 AM. U.L. REv. 1141-45 (1985). To a certain extent, these articles rely on a theory
from C. GILLIGAN, IN A DIFFERENT VOICE (1982). Ms. Gilligan hypothesizes that women
often have different ways of moral reasoning than men and, therefore, focus on contextual
thought processes and interpersonal relationships rather than linear thinking and individual
achievement. Id. at 19.
By using the female voice, I hope to draw a picture of the life of a typical single woman
with children who has qualified for IRCA amnesty but who continues to face serious economic
and legal hardships.
29. As a legalization counselor, I assisted IRCA amnesty applicants with the paperwork
and legal processes required by the IRCA amnesty application.
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any history of receipt of public assistance to stop the public assistance
immediately.
After our initial interview, Alicia and I wrote and spoke on the tele-
phone frequently to discuss how she could get a job as soon as possible
and also work quickly to gather all her documents to prove that she had
a history of employment without receipt of public assistance.
When we next met, Alicia had found work pitting apricots. She
explained that the work involved using a small knife to take out the pits.
Her hands and fingers were a testament to her labor. They were a canvas
of small, thin knife cuts, all colored pale orange by the apricot juices.
When I looked at her hands, I imagined the sting of the apricot juices as
they ran over the cuts on her hands and fingers.
Alicia seemed to have a fatalistic view of the amnesty application
process. One day I received a letter from her. Along with some docu-
ments demonstrating her employment history, she wrote that if it was the
will of God for her to get amnesty then she would, but if it wasn't then
she would just go on. Despite what she wrote, she gathered numerous
letters and documents to establish her work history.
Alicia generally brought her two younger children to our meetings
because she could not afford to pay for child care. They were the chil-
dren of a man with whom she seemed to have a steady relationship. Ap-
parently, he provided some financial support for his children. Alicia's
two older children were the children of her husband who had left her a
number of years ago and returned to Mexico. Alicia had no contact with
him and received no child support from him.
We went to the INS interview in late July.30 Alicia brought her
youngest daughter, Maria del Carmen, and her oldest son, Juan Carlos,
who was nine at the time. The INS adjudicator let the children come
back to the room with Alicia and me. Maria squirmed on Alicia's lap as
Alicia answered the hearing officer's questions. Although she had only
been working for a few months, she was able to establish a history of
employment without the receipt of public assistance. The adjudicator
recommended her for approval. Alicia received her work authorization
card and now has temporary residency. Presumably, she is on her way to
becoming a legal, permanent resident and then a United States citizen.
However, Alicia's troubles are not over. She is still a single mother
30. Every amnesty applicant is required to meet with an INS employee, called an "adjudi-
cator" at an INS district office. At these interviews, applicants are asked about their employ-




with four young children, a low paying job and no ready access to child
care. Yet, the government requires her to provide for them without re-
ceiving public assistance for five years. The children are currently eligi-
ble for public assistance because they are all United States citizens, but
their AFDC funds may be imputed to Alicia and defeat her application
for legal, permanent residency. She faces a dilemma: continuing to re-
ceive the AFDC for her children and risking the chance to gain legal
status in the United States, or refusing AFDC for her children and at-
tempting to support them by finding permanent (most likely hourly)
work and finding a way to care for her children while working.
When Alicia was recommended for approval, we were all happy. I
drove Alicia, Juan Carlos, and Maria back to the bus station so they
could catch the bus back to the little farming town in which they live.
She offered to buy me lunch, but I had to get back to work. I thanked
her and said it was okay. When I dropped Alicia and her children off at
the bus station, she said in Spanish, "May the Lord praise you." I'll
never forget her words; they are simple, but knowing they came from this
woman who had a deep, fatalistic faith, I was really touched that she
would have me in her prayers. I will never forget her. In many ways she
has been the inspiration for writing this Note.
II. HISTORICAL OVERVIEW
A. The Public Charge Exclusion in the Immigration and
Nationality Act
Since 1882 the INA has denied entry into the United States to
aliens who are "likely to become a public charge."31 The traditional
standard for determining a public charge is a liberal,32 prospective evalu-
ation of the alien's ability to support herself based on such factors as age,
health, vocation, and the availability of family and friends in the United
States willing to ensure support.33 This test is also referred to as a "total-
ity of the circumstances" test.
34
Recognizing the United States immigrant roots35 and the belief in
looking to a person's future and not her past, the United States Congress
31. INA, supra note 3, § 212(a)(8), (15) (codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(8), (15) (1988)).
32. Here, the term "liberal" indicates a generous outlook, one that encourages otherwise
qualified aliens to apply for legal residence in the United States.
33. Memorandum Opinion and Order, Zambrano v. INS, Civ. No. S-88-455 EJG-EM, at
3-5 (E.D. Cal. Aug. 9, 1988) [hereinafter Opinion and Order].
34. INS, Memorandum No. CO 1588-P, The Effect of the Receipt of AFDC Benefits on
Eligibility for Legalization I (Apr. 21, 1988); Opinion and Order, supra note 33, at 4.
35. In re Griffiths, 413 U.S. 717, 719 (1973).
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has traditionally provided additional avenues in the INA for aliens, with
limited economic means, to overcome the public charge exclusion.36
Pre-IRCA cases involving the public charge exclusion demonstrate
that immigration courts have traditionally considered an alien's potential
for future self-reliance rather than her past.37 The Bureau of Immigra-
tion Appeals (BIA) has held that the mere receipt of public assistance in
the past does not establish that an alien is likely to become a public
charge. 38 The BIA has also held that "a healthy person in the prime of
life cannot ordinarily be considered likely to become a public charge."
'39
The INA also contains provisions that allow an alien to overcome
the public charge exclusion even though circumstances in her back-
ground would ordinarily preclude her from meeting the traditional pro-
spective standard. For example, an alien with a public charge exclusion
problem can post a bond' or submit an "affidavit of support"4 1 to the
INS from "any responsible person" in the United States willing to ensure
her support.42
B. Legislative History of the Public Charge Exclusion in the IRCA
The legislative history of the IRCA indicates that Congress intended
to liberalize the traditional standard for the public charge exclusion, with
the express purpose of allowing large numbers of aliens, including those
with low incomes, to qualify for amnesty.43
Congress liberalized the public charge exclusion in three ways.
First, Congress established a two-tiered system approach to overcome
the public charge exclusion. Initially, applicants may try to meet the
traditional prospective standard described above.' For those applicants
who do not qualify for admission under this traditional standard, Con-
36. See supra and infra notes 31-42 and accompanying text.
37. In re Perez, 15 I&N Dec. 136, 137 (BIA 1974).
38. Id.
39. In re Martinez-Lopez, 10 I&N Dec. 409, 421 (BIA 1962).
40. Plaintiffs' Brief in Support of Motion for Temporary Restraining Order/Preliminary
Injunction at 21, Zambrano v. INS, No. S-88-455 EJG-EM (E.D. Cal. Apr. 12, 1988) [herein-
after Plaintiffs' Brief].
41. Id. (citing C.F.R. § 42.91(a)(15)(4) (1989) (permitting "any responsible person" to
submit affidavits of support)). An affidavit of support, referred to by the INS as a Form 1-134,
allows an alien to demonstrate that she has friends or relations willing to support her in this
country.
42. Id.
43. See 130 CONG. REC. 16,727-29 (1984); see also H.R. REP. No. 682, 99th Cong., 2d
Sess., pt. 1, at 71, 72 (1986).
44. See supra notes 31-39 and accompanying text.
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gress created the Special Rule.45
Under the Special Rule, applicants can overcome the public charge
exclusion by "showing a history of employment without receipt of public
cash assistance.",4 6  The IRCA defines public cash assistance to include
AFDC, general assistance, and social security.4 7 With the Special Rule,
Congress intended to create a system that offered options to people who
would not otherwise qualify for amnesty under the IRCA.4"
Secondly, the IRCA defines "history of employment" under the
Special Rule as a history that demonstrates continuous employment,
regular attachment to the workforce, an income earned over a substantial
period of time, and the capacity to exist and maintain a family without
the use of public assistance.49 Under the Special Rule, even an applicant
who cannot meet the traditional prospective standard because of ad-
vanced age or ill health, for example, may still qualify for amnesty if she
can establish that, in the past, she has been able to exist on her income
and maintain her family without the receipt of public assistance.5 0
As a final measure, Congress established a general waiver process in
the initial application stage5 that permits applicants who cannot meet
the public charge exclusion test to qualify on humanitarian grounds. 2
The legislative history of the IRCA demonstrates that the INS regu-
lations are too restrictive. Congress intended large numbers of people to
qualify under the IRCA program. 3 It specifically recognized that large
numbers of undocumented persons live at or below the poverty level.54
45. See supra and infra notes 43-58 and accompaning text.
46. INA, supra note 3, § 245A(d)(2)(B)(iii), amended by IRCA, supra note 2, § 201(a)
(codified as amended at 8 U.S.C. § 1255a (d)(2)(B)(iii) (1988)).
47. The code states that" 'public cash assistance' means income or needs-based monetary
assistance, to include but not limited to supplemental security income, received by the alien or
his or her immediate family members through federal, state, or local programs designed to
meet subsistence levels." 8 C.F.R. § 245a.l(i) (1987).
48. See H.R. REP. No. 682, 99th Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 1, at 49, reprinted in 1986 U.S. CODE
CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 5649, 5653.
49. 8 C.F.R. § 245a.2(k)(4) (1989).
50. Id.
51. When Congress passed the IRCA, it created two stages for applicants to go through in
order to attain permanent residency status. IRCA, supra note 2, § 201(a) (codified at 8 U.S.C.
§§ 1255a(a)-(b)(1) (1988)).
52. INA, supra note 3, § 245A (d)(2)(B)(i), amended by IRCA, supra note 2, § 201(a)
(codified as amended at 8 U.S.C. 1255a(d)(2)(B)(i) (1988)). It does not appear that a BIA
judge has yet ruled on a definition of "humanitarian grounds" in the IRCA context. However,
in In re P-, 1989 Fed. Immigr. L. Rptr. (CCH), Interim Dec. No. 3090 (BIA Nov. 1988), the
BIA held that "Congress contemplated that waivers under section 245A of the Act be granted
liberally." Id. at 8.
53. H.R. REP. No. 682, 99th Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 1, at 49, 72 (1986).
54. Plaintiffs' Brief, supra note 40, at 22 (citing H.R. REP. No. 682, supra note 53, at 49).
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The INS regulations are too restrictive because they preclude from quali-
fication many applicants who have received public assistance to support
their children. Additionally, Congress indicated that it did not require
strict compliance with all the grounds for exclusion when it stated that
applicants should be "in compliance with most of the [thirty-three]
grounds of exclusion in current law.""
Through the Special Rule for public charge determination, Congress
intentionally demonstrated more flexibility than it has historically dis-
played in immigration legislation. 6 The House Judiciary Committee, in
particular, recognized that "a generous program" for amnesty was neces-
sary to effectuate true immigration reform.57 Congress was aware of the
special needs of many people who would qualify under the amnesty pro-
grams and the necessity for state and federal governments to address
these needs through public assistance programs.5 The comments of the
congressional committees reflect their intent that the legislation make al-
lowances for the difficult economic situation of many amnesty applicants.
III. THE INS MISINTERPRETS THE IRCA AND THE
EFFECT ON APPLICANTS AND POTENTIAL
APPLICANTS
A. The Creation of a Retrospective Test
The INS exceeded its statutory authority when it promulgated regu-
lations on the public charge exclusion that misinterpreted and ignored
the Congressional intent to use a prospective test to allow large numbers
of aliens to qualify for amnesty. 9 The regulations establish a purely ret-
rospective test that defeats the purpose of the IRCA.6 °
The Special Rule enacted by Congress gives applicants greater op-
portunities to meet the public charge exclusion test. It states: "an alien is
not ineligible for adjustment of status under this section due to being
inadmissible under section 212(a)(15)61 if the alien demonstrates a his-
55. Id. at 72 (emphasis added).
56. 130 CONG. REC. 16,727-29 (1984).
57. See H.R. REP. No. 682, supra note 53, at 71-72.
58. H.R. REP. No. 1,000, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 74 (1986).
59. See infra notes 61-80-and accompanying text.
60. Id.
61. Section 212(a) of the INA lists 33 exclusions that preclude otherwise admissible aliens
from legally emigrating to the United States. They range from membership in a communist
party and conviction for narcotics smuggling to "sexual deviance" and the likelihood that an




tory of employment in the United States evidencing self-support without
receipt of public assistance." 62 This rule clearly liberalizes the traditional
standard for determining when an applicant is "likely to become a public
charge" by giving applicants two ways to avoid the public charge exclu-
sion.63 The first way is the traditional prospective test developed from
section 212(a)(15) of the INA.64 The second is the "history of employ-
ment ... without receipt of public assistance" test.15 With these two
opportunities to avoid the public charge exclusion, two types of appli-
cants may now qualify for amnesty: (1) applicants with a history of em-
ployment without the receipt of public assistance who are unable to meet
the prospective test because of advanced age or ill health and (2) appli-
cants who have received public assistance, but who have the capacity to
support themselves and their families in the future.
Unlike the Special Rule, the INS regulations make the public charge
exclusion standard more restrictive.66 The INS Proof of Financial Re-
sponsibility regulations state: "An applicant for adjustment of status
under this part is subject to the provisions of section 212(a)(15) of the
INA relating to excludability of aliens likely to become public charges
unless the applicant demonstrates a history of employment in the United
States evidencing self-support without receipt of public cash assist-
ance."67 The PFR regulations conflict with the language of the congres-
sional statute since the regulations do not require a finding of
inadmissibility under the traditional prospective standard before evaluat-
ing an applicant's work history and receipt of public assistance. Thus,
under the PFR regulations the applicant is subject to exclusion unless she
demonstrates both a history of employment and the absence of public
assistance.
The PFR regulations are more restrictive than the statute in four
specific ways.68 First, the regulations redefine the requirements of the
public charge exclusion by stating that applicants are ineligible for legali-
zation unless they meet the history of employment without receipt of
public assistance test.69 Second, the INS attributes public assistance re-
62. INA, supra note 3, § 245A(d)(2)(B)(iii), amended by IRCA, supra note 2, § 201(a)
(codified as amended at 8 U.S.C. 1255a(d)(2)(B)(iii) (1988)).
63. See supra notes 31-58 and accompanying text for discussion of the public charge
exclusion.
64. See supra notes 31-42 and accompanying text for discussion of the prospective test.
65. IRCA, supra note 2, § 201(a) (codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1255a(d)(2)(B)(iii) (1988)).
66. See infra notes 68-76 and accompanying text.
67. 8 C.F.R. § 254a.2(d)(4) (1989) (emphasis added).
68. Plaintiffs' Brief, supra note 40, at 19.
69. Id.
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ceived by members of the applicant's family to the alien applicant.7 °
Third, contrary to the plain language of the Special Rule, the PFR regu-
lations require aliens who do not meet the PFR guidelines to submit ap-
plications for a waiver.71 Fourth, the regulations limit the submission of
Affidavits of Support to spouses and parents of applicants, undermining
preexisting law that accepts affidavits from "any responsible person."72
In addition, under the PFR regulations, public charge bonds are not
available, as they were under the general INA provisions.73
The PFR regulations require proof that applicants have never re-
ceived public assistance, or that they are self-supporting without a need
for public assistance.74 However, the IRCA clearly mandates legaliza-
tion for all aliens who meet either the traditional test of admissibility75 or
the Special Rule test.76
These restrictive standards make it especially difficult for single wo-
men with children to overcome the public charge exclusion. Because
they are the primary caretakers of their children,77 it is usually more
difficult for these women to find employment due to child care needs.78
Consequently, these women are more likely to need public assistance.
According to the INS regulations, receipt of AFDC is imputed only
to applicants legally considered family of an AFDC recipient.79 There-
fore, only a parent not living with an AFDC recipient can apply for am-
nesty without facing the public charge exclusion. The vast majority of all
AFDC families, which are headed by single women, are excluded from
amnesty under these regulations.80
B. Inconsistency of the INS Regulations
The plaintiffs in Zambrano argue that the INS issued inconsistent
70. Id. at 20; 8 C.F.R. § 245a.l(i) (1989).
71. Plaintiffs' Brief, supra note 40, at 20-21.
72. Id. at 21.
73. Id.
74. 8 C.F.R. § 245a.2(d)(4) (1989).
75. 8 U.S.C. § 1255.a(a)(4)(A) (1987); see supra notes 31-42 and accompanying text for an
explanation of this admissibility test.
76. 8 U.S.C. § 1255a(d)(B)(iii) (1987).
77. See Declaration of Marta Zambrano at 1, Zambrano v. INS, Civ. No. S-88-455 EJG-
EM (E.D. Cal. Apr. 12, 1988); Declaration of Martha Ozuna at 1, Zambrano v. INS, Civ. No.
S-88-455 EJG-EM (E.D. Cal. Apr. 12, 1988).
78. Only 15 percent of divorced women in the United States are awarded spousal support.
U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, CHILD SUPPORT AND ALIMONY:
1985, at 6 (Current Population Reports No. 152, Series P-23, 1985).
79. 8 C.F.R. § 245a.l(i) (1989).
80. Plaintiffs' Complaint, supra note 9, at 3-4.
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regulations regarding the public charge exclusion."' These inconsisten-
cies, coupled with a failure to accurately publicize the correct public
charge standards,8 2 created great confusion and discouraged many po-
tential amnesty applicants.
s3
The final INS regulations for the IRCA program were not published
until May 1, 1987, three days before the program was to begin. 4 Both
the INS and the Qualified Designated Entities,85 the community organi-
zations designated by the INS to offer assistance to applicants, had little
time to adequately understand the regulations so as to effectively advise
amnesty applicants.8 6 This lack of complete understanding contributed
to the climate of confusion.
7
Additionally, declarations of the Zambrano plaintiffs and QDE em-
ployees indicate that the QDEs were misinformed about the meaning of
the regulations.8 8 Community and church groups were chosen to serve
as liasions between the INS and undocumented people because undocu-
mented people generally fear the INS and feel comfortable in seeking
help from the QDEs. However, with the inconsistent interpretations of
the regulations and their arbitrary enforcement, the QDEs sometimes ad-
ded to the confusion by telling applicants they could not qualify for am-
nesty because their United States citizen children received AFDC,89 or
that they should first get a job and give up public assistance before apply-
ing for amnesty. 90
In his August 9, 1988 order, Judge Garcia agreed with the Zam-
brano plaintiffs' argument that the INS created confusion by failing to
81. d at 4.
82. Plaintiffs' Supplemental Brief in Support of Motions for Preliminary Injunction and
Class Certification and in Opposition to Defendant's Motion to Dismiss at 10-11, Zambrano v.
INS, Civ. No. S-88-455 EJG-EM (E.D. Cal. May 17, 1988) [hereinafter Plaintiffs' Supplemen-
tal Brief].
83. See supra note 29, 30 and accompanying text and infra notes 84-90 and accompanying
text.
84. Plaintiffs' Complaint, supra note 9, at 16.
85. See supra note 24.
86. Declaration of David Perez at 3, Zambrano v. INS, Civ. No. S-88-455 EJG-EM (E.D.
Cal. May 17, 1988); Declaration of Penelope Seator at 1-2, Zambrano v. INS, Civ. No. S-88-
455 EJG-EM (E.D. Cal. May 17, 1988).
87. Conversation with Frances Martinez, Director of the Legalization Program of Catho-
lic Community Services (July 1987); id. (Apr. 1988).
88. Declaration of Maria Santana at 2, Zambrano v. INS, Civ. No. S-88-455 EJG-EM
(E.D. Cal. May 17, 1988); Declaration of Raoul Aroz at 2, Zambrano v. INS, Civ. No. S-88-
455 EJG-EM (E.D. Cal. May 17, 1988); Declaration of Andres Bustamante at 1, Zambrano v.
INS, Civ. No. S-88-455 EJG-EM (E.D. Cal. May 17, 1988).
89. Declaration of Andrea Ruiz at 2, Zambrano v. INS, Civ. No. S-88-455 EJG-EM
(E.D. Cal. Apr. 12, 1988).
90. Declaration of Marta Zambrano, supra note 77, at 1.
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accurately and sufficiently establish and publicize the true nature of the
public charge exclusion.91 The judge observed that the INS was respon-
sible for the lack of clarity and noted that the INS had to clarify its own
interpretation of the regulations three times.9"
C. Effect of the Regulations
Three groups of potential applicants are most adversely affected by
the INS regulations. First, many women are denied the IRCA amnesty
because of the public charge exclusion.93 A second group of women are
deterred from applying due to the inconsistency of the INS in applying
the public charge exclusion.94 A third group of women qualified for the
first stage of amnesty, but face problems qualifying for the second stage
and attaining permanent legal status.
1. Those Who Are Prevented From Qualifying
Two groups of women are effectively prevented from qualifying for
the IRCA amnesty. They have either been denied amnesty or missed the
application deadline because of confusion about the public charge exclu-
sion regulations. These two groups are included in the Zambrano suit.
95
(a) Women who did not qualify.-Although the overall qualification
rate is extremely high, a large percentage who have not qualified are sin-
gle women with children. 96 These applicants were uncertain about the
applicable standard97 for the public charge exclusion, and went to great
expense' in applying for amnesty only to be denied. 99
Graciela Lopez 1" is an example of an applicant who applied for
amnesty but was recommended for denial because her United States citi-
zen children received AFDC.' She is twenty-seven years old and the
91. Order of July 31, 1989, supra note 15, at 14.
92. Id. at 13.
93. Plaintiffs' Complaint, supra note 9, at 13.
94. Id.
95. Id.
96. Conversation with Beth Zacovic, Legal Aid Attorney (Feb. 1988). The INS refused to
comply with discovery orders that would allow Legal Aid and the CRLA to compile statistics
showing this fact. The CRLA and Legal Aid are currently seeking sanctions for the INS
refusal to comply.
97. See supra notes 43-80 and accompanying text for a discussion of the varied
"standards."
98. Declaration of David Perez, supra note 86, at 2.
99. Id.
100. Ms. Lopez is one of the named plaintiffs in the Zambrano suit.
101. Declaration of Graciela Lopez at 1, Zambrano v. INS, Civ. No. S-88-455 EJG-EM
(E.D. Cal. Apr. 12, 1988).
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mother of five children, all born in the United States."°2 Ms. Lopez's
children received AFDC intermittently from 1982 to 1987 because she
was unable to work.10 3 During this period Ms. Lopez gave birth to three
children, including one who needed several operations. 1" Although Ms.
Lopez has worked, she has had to quit her jobs to care for her chil-
dren.1"5 Her declaration demonstrates the plight of many single
mothers: "I received AFDC for the kids because it was the only way that
I could care for them when their fathers abandoned us... ,106
The difficult circumstances faced by the many undocumented single
women with children demand special constitutional consideration by
United States courts. 10 7 Their situations should have been recognized by
the INS when it established regulations regarding the public charge
exclusion. 10 8
(b) Women who did not apply for amnesty.-Women in the second
group of potential applicants often live in situations similar to those wo-
men who were denied amnesty. This second group has been discouraged
from applying for amnesty because of the INS misinterpretation of the
law and the inaccurate publicity regarding the public charge exclusion.10 9
In California, for example, at least 4000 potential women applicants
chose not to apply for amnesty. 1 Some did not apply because they
feared they would not qualify and would be subject to deportation.
Others chose to forfeit the opportunity for amnesty because their chil-
dren could not survive without public assistance.' 1
Maria Santana is a single women with four children, all under the
age of eight.1 ' She works part-time but still cannot support her family
102. Id
103. Id. at 2.
104. Id at 1-2.
105. Id
106. Id at 3.
107. See infra notes 130-84 and accompanying text.
108. See supra notes 43-58 and accompanying text.
109. See Declaration of David Perez, supra note 86; Declaration of Samuel Krantz, Zam-
brano v. INS, Civ. No. S-88-455 EJG-EM (E.D. Cal. May 17, 1988); Declaration of Shari
Cruhlac, Zambrano v. INS, Civ. No. S-88-455 EJG-EM (E.D. Cal. May 17, 1988).
110. Declaration of Beth Zacovic at 2, Zambrano v. INS, Civ. No. S-88-455 EJG-EM
(E.D. Cal. May 17, 1988). Ms. Zacovic interviewed a legislative analyst for Los Angeles
County in April 1988 to obtain these statistics.
111. See Declaration of Marta Zambrano, supra note 77; Declaration of Margarita Rodri-
guez, Zambrano v. INS, Civ. No. S-88-455 EJG-EM (E.D. Cal. Apr. 12, 1988); Declaration of
Graciela Lopez, supra note 101; Declaration of Andrea Ruiz, supra note 89; Declaration of
Martha Ozuna, supra note 77; Declaration of Jorge Perdomo, Zambrano v. INS, Civ. No. S-
88-455 EJG-EM (E.D. Cal. Apr. 12, 1988).
112. Declaration of Maria Santana, supra note 88, at 1-2.
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without receipt of AFDC funds. 1 3 When an immigration advocacy
worker told Ms. Santana that she would probably not qualify for am-
nesty, she did not apply. "4 She felt she had to continue to rely on
AFDC to support her United States citizen children."
15
Single women with children who have been prevented from qualify-
ing for amnesty face immediate serious consequences. These women lack
the necessary authorization to obtain legal work in the United States." 6
One possible result is the exploitation of these women in illegal sweat-
shops and other unhealthy work environments. 117 These women may be
forced into an underclass, unable to legally support their children and
permanently dependent on AFDC and other public benefits." 8
Although the INS may believe that they will return to Mexico, these
women state in their affidavits that they will remain in the United States
for the safety, health, and education of their children, many of whom are
United States citizens.' 19
2. Women Who Do Qualify
The third group of women affected by the public charge exclusion
regulations is composed of women who applied for amnesty and qualified
either by overcoming the Proof of Financial Responsibility regulations or
through the waiver process. These women receive work authorization
and do not, at least for now, face the quandary of choosing between ille-
gal work and returning to their native countries. Unfortunately, they
still face many economic and legal hardships created by the INS
regulations.
All applicants who receive temporary residency status under the
first stage of the IRCA amnesty program must apply to become legal
permanent residents [hereinafter LPRs] eighteen months after their grant
of temporary residency.' 2o This is the second stage of the IRCA amnesty
113. Id.
114. Id.
115. Id. at 2.
116. The IRCA has changed United States immigration law so that it is now illegal to hire
undocumented aliens. INA, supra note 3, § 274A, amended by IRCA, supra note 2, § 101(a)
(codified as amended at 8 U.S.C. § 1324a (1988)). Successful IRCA applicants become docu-
mented aliens and, therefore, receive legal authorization to work. Id.
117. See Stevenson, Jobs Being Filled by IllegalAliens Despite Sanctions, N.Y. Times, Oct.
9, 1989, at Al, col. 3.
118. Id.; see also Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 208 (1982) (Denial of public education may
result in illegal aliens becoming "permanently locked in the lowest socio-economic class.").
119. Declaration of Graciela Lopez, supra note 101; Declaration of Marta Zambrano,
supra note 77.




When they apply for LPR status, these applicants again face the
INS Proof of Financial Responsibility regulations. In the second stage,
however, waivers are limited to applicants who were eligible for social
security benefits during the month they were granted temporary sta-
tus.1 2 1 Applicants receiving other forms of public assistance probably
will be denied permanent residence. 122
In addition to the PFR regulations and the loss of potential waivers,
those who qualify for amnesty are banned from the receipt of most forms
of public assistance for five years from the date that they become legal
temporary residents.1 23  Since the INS regulations impute the receipt of
public assistance by United States citizens to a family member applicant,
the continuing receipt of public assistance, by children or other family
members, can disqualify an applicant from the amnesty program in the
second stage.124 Applicants may continue to receive limited, mostly
nonfinancial, emergency assistance and some Medicaid services.1 25 Their
U.S. citizen children remain eligible for programs like AFDC but, as ex-
plained previously, the receipt of public assistance may be imputed to the
mother in her amnesty application.1 26 As in the first stage, many women
must choose between the receipt of public assistance to keep their family
financially solvent and the loss of that financial security to complete the
second stage of the amnesty process. Because many single women with
children cannot survive financially without assistance, many who made it
through the first stage are forced to forego completing the process. This
situation is less likely to be faced by single men or married people be-
cause these two classes do not have the same child care concerns as single
women with children.1 27 Married people have the option of having one
parent work while the other cares for the children or having both work
and paying for child care. Single men generally do not have children for
whom they are responsible on a daily basis. These two groups, therefore,
are less likely to be dependent on public assistance.
128
121. Id. § 245a.3(g)(3)(ii).
122. IRCA, supra note 2, § 201(a) (codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1255a(d)(2)(B)(ii)(II) (1988)).
123. Id. (codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1255a(h)(1) (1988)).
124. 8 U.S.C. 1255a(b)(c)(i) (1988). One of the requirements for admissibility is that the
person not be "like[ly] to become a public charge." INA, supra note 3, §§ 212(a)(8), (15)
(codified at 8 U.S.C. §§ 182(a)(8), (15) (1988)).
125. IRCA, suprna note 2, § 201(a) (codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1255a(h)(3)-(4) (1988)).
126. 8 C.F.R. § 245a.2(k)(4) (1989); see also Order of July 31, 1989, supra note 15, at 5.
127. See Declaration of Marta Zambrano, supra note 77, at 1-2; Declaration of Martha
Ozuna, supra note 77, at 1.
128. See supra note 12 and accompanying text.
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Regardless whether these women choose to forego public assistance
for their children, or to forego amnesty, they are entering a poverty class.
This dilemma is illustrated by the story of one potential applicant who
became homeless because she gave up public assistance to apply for
amnesty. 129
IV. VIOLATIONS OF CONSTITUTIONAL GUARANTEES
AND INTERNATIONAL LAW
The discriminatory impact of the INS public charge exclusion regu-
lations on single women with children violates the Equal Protection
Clause of the United States Constitution and a number of international
human rights treaties.
A. The Equal Protection Argument
The benefits of legalization are not available on an equal basis to all
potential amnesty applicants. A significant number of women are ad-
versely affected by the INS regulations to the IRCA amnesty program
solely because of their status as single women with children. This vio-
lates the Equal Protection Clause of the fourteenth amendment of the
United States Constitution.13 ° To establish an equal protection violation,
applicants and potential applicants under the IRCA program must
demonstrate that the INS regulations fail to meet one of the equal protec-
tion standards enunciated by the United States Supreme Court.13 1 The
Equal Protection Clause "introduced a new concept into constitutional
analysis by requiring that individuals be treated in a manner similar to
others as an independent constitutional guarantee."
'132
The Supreme Court has developed three standards of review. The
first standard of review is the rational relationship test and is generally
applied to economic and social legislation. 133 The Court asks whether
the classification bears a rational relationship to a related state inter-
est. 134 The second standard, the strict scrutiny test, requires that the
government show a compelling reason for its regulation and that the par-
129. Declaration of Mavis Anderson, Zambrano v. INS, Civ. No. S-88-455 EJG-EM (E.D.
Cal. Apr. 12, 1988).
130. Plaintiffs' Brief, supra note 40, at 27, 28; Declaration of Andres Bustamante, supra
note 88, at 1.
131. See generally J. NOWAK, R. ROTUNDA, & J. YOUNG, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 590-99
(2d ed. 1983) [hereinafter J. NOWAK] for a discussion of such standards.
132. Id. at 585.
133. Id. at 591.
134. See generally New Orleans v. Dukes, 427 U.S. 297 (1976).
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ticular classification is necessary to achieve that compelling interest,1 35 or
it requires the plaintiff to demonstrate that a fundamental right 136 has
been abridged by a government regulation.
An intermediate test is applied to discrimination based on gender 37
or legal status as an undocumented child.13' The intermediate test re-
quires that the classifications "serve important governmental objectives
and ... be substantially related to achievement of those objectives."
' 139
Although the Court traditionally applies the strict scrutiny " standard
to alienage, it has held that undocumented people are not a suspect
class. 141 There is some argument that a significant level of scrutiny
should be applied to invalidate state restrictions on certain benefits to
undocumented people, such as emergency health care.142 The Court has
never addressed whether there can be a special group of adult undocu-
mented people, such as single women with children, who deserve treat-
ment distinct from the group of adult undocumented people as a
whole. 143 Therefore, this discussion uses the Court's intermediate stan-
dard to evaluate the application of the Equal Protection Clause to single
women with children.
In cases that determine the rights of aliens to public benefits, the
United States Supreme Court has consistently found that undocumented
people are "persons" guaranteed due process of law by the fifth and four-
teenth amendments. 1" The Court has also held that the fifth amend-
135. J. NOWAK, supra note 131, at 591-92.
136. Fundamental rights have been defined as those "rights which the Court recognizes as
having a value so essential to individual liberty in our society that they justify the justices
reviewing the acts of other branches of government in a manner quite similar to the substantive
due process approach of the pre-1937 period." Id. at 457. The authors go on to say that since
the concept of fundamental rights is based in natural law, it is difficult to develop a more
precise definition. Id.
137. Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976).
138. Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202 (1982).
139. Craig, 429 U.S. 190.
140. "This test means that the justices will not defer to the decision of the other branches
of government but will instead independently determine the degree of relationship which the
classification bears to a constitutionally compelling end." J. NOWAK, supra note 131, at 591
(citing Horton v. Califano, 472 F. Supp. 339, 343 (W.D. Va. 1979)).
141. Plyler, 457 U.S. at 223. "Suspect class" has been defined as "a traditionally disfavored
class in our society.., more likely to be used without pausing to consider its justification."
Mathews v. Lucas, 427 U.S. 495, 521 (1976) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
142. See Note, State Legislation Denying Subsistence Benefits to Undocumented Aliens: An
Equal Protection Approach, 61 TEX. L. REv. 859, 861 (1983).
143. This theory was suggested to the author during a conversation with Professor Ray
Forrester, University of California, Hastings College of the Law (Aug. 31, 1987).
144. Shaunghnessy v. Mezei, 345 U.S. 206, 212 (1953); Wong Wing v. United States, 163
U.S. 228, 238 (1896); Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 369 (1886).
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ment protects undocumented persons from "invidious discrimi-
nation." '145 Additionally, the Court has held that the government can-
not, through its actions, create a subclass of residents, 146 and that an
entitlement to benefits should be determined by examining the nature
and character of the undocumented person's relationship with the United
States.147 Thus, the case law establishes that constitutional guarantees,
including the right of equal protection, apply to undocumented people
residing in the United States. The Supreme Court's focus on the nature
and character of an undocumented person's relationship to the United
States gives weight to the proposition that single women with United
States citizen children are a class distinct from the adult undocumented
population in general. This class, therefore, should be given separate
equal protection consideration.
In 1982 the Supreme Court decided Plyler v. Doe,14 a case involving
a state statute that denied "illegal alien"1 49 children the right to public
school education.' 5 The Court held that denying these children the
right to a public school education violated the Equal Protection
Clause.1 51  The Plyer Court did not base its decision on the children's
status as a suspect class or on public education as a fundamental right.'5 2
Instead, the Court held that the children were special members of an
"underclass" of undocumented people.153 The Court further found that
the statute "imposes a lifetime hardship on a discrete class of children
not accountable for their disabling status."'5 4
The Court based its decision on the children's natural innocence and
inability to control their status. 5 5 Although the Court expressly stated
that education is not a fundamental right, 156 it also commented that "ed-
ucation prepares individuals to be self-reliant and self-sufficient partici-
pants in society."'1
5 7
145. See Mathews v. Diaz, 426 U.S. 67, 77-80 (1976).
146. Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 213 (1982).
147. Mathews, 426 U.S. at 80.
148. 457 U.S. 202.
149. "Illegal aliens" are people who immigrate to the United States without proper visas or
legal permission. The immigration rights community prefers the term "undocumented per-
son" to "illegal alien." See supra note 10.
150. Plyler, 457 U.S. 202.
151. Id. at 213.
152. Id. at 223.
153. Id. at 219-20.
154. Id. at 223.
155. Id. at 220, 223-24.
156. Id. at 221.
157. Id. at 222 (quoting Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 221 (1972)).
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The Court noted the especially difficult circumstances under which
undocumented people live.158 In addition, the majority acknowledged
the contributions these people have made to the economy of the United
States. 1 9 Finally, the Court stated that the status of undocumented peo-
ple is not immutable, since many are likely to become legal residents. 60
The Plyer justifications for treating undocumented children as a
class requiring greater protection may be applicable to single women
with children under the IRCA. The groups share many of the same dis-
advantages. In Plyler, the Court held that illegal children, because of
their innocence and inability to control their status, are not "comparably
situated" to undocumented adults. 6 ' Like undocumented children, sin-
gle women with children are "special members of [an] underclass."'
' 62
While this class of women may not have the "innocence" of children,
because of their inability to control their status they are not "comparably
situated"' 63 to other adult undocumented people.
It is because these women have children that they are at a disadvan-
tage to other undocumented people. The disproportionality of the bur-
den of child care and support is evidenced by the statistic that almost
ninety percent of all AFDC families are headed by single women. 64 Be-
cause of their status, these single women are denied legalization under
the INS regulations.'
65
The vast majority of undocumented people come to the United
States to find work.' 66 Unfortunately, single undocumented women with
children are unable to find sufficient work to support themselves and
their United States citizen children, largely because they must care for
their children.1 67  Because of these disadvantages, these women must
rely on public assistance. 168 However, the PFR regulations deny am-
nesty to anyone receiving public assistance.' 69 Like the Texas statute in
158. Id. at 208.
159. Id.
160. Id at 220, 226.
161. Id at 220.
162. Id. at 219.
163. Id. at 220.
164. Plaintiffs' Brief, supra note 40, at 27.
165. See Plaintiffs' Complaint, supra note 9; see also Plaintiffs' Brief, supra note 40, at 28.
166. Plyer v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 228 (1982).
167. Declaration of Andrea Ruiz, supra note 89; Declaration of Marta Zambrano, supra
note 77; Declaration of Graciela Lopez, supra note 101; Declaration of Martha Ozuna, supra
note 77.
168. Declaration of Andrea Ruiz, supra note 89, at 1-2; Declaration of Marta Zambrano,
supra note 77, at 2; Declaration of Graciela Lopez, supra note 101, at 1-2.
169. See supra notes 66-80 and accompanying text.
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Plyler, the PFR regulations "impose a lifetime hardship on a discrete
class.., not accountable for their disabling status."' 70 If an exception is
not made for these women, they will be unfairly denied their right to
amnesty.
The majority in Plyler stated that one of the goals of the Equal Pro-
tection Clause is the "abolition of governmental barriers presenting un-
reasonable obstacles to advancement on the basis of individual merit."' 71
The Court also stated that "the Equal Protection Clause was intended to
work nothing less than the abolition of all caste-based and invidious
class-based legislation."' 72 The INS regulations violate these women's
equal protection rights because the regulations are "unreasonable obsta-
cles" to amnesty and indirectly discriminate against them as a class. 173
The Plyler Court stated:
This situation raises the specter of a permanent caste of undocumented
resident aliens, encouraged by some to remain here as a source of
cheap labor, but nevertheless denied the benefits that our society
makes available to citizens and lawful residents. The existence of such
an underclass presents most difficult problems for a Nation that prides
itself on adherence to principles of equality under law.
174
This argument is equally applicable here.
The intermediate test of the equal protection standard requires the
INS to show that these regulations further a substantial goal of the
state. 75 The legislative history of the INA and the IRCA indicates that
Congress and the INS promulgated public charge exclusion regulations
in order to control the use of public assistance by the public.17 6 How-
ever, the Plyler Court placed doubt on the adequacy of this goal when it
stated that "a concern for the preservation of resources standing alone
can hardly justify the classification used in allocating those resources."' 177
The Plyler Court discounted three arguments made by the State of
Texas. The same arguments are raised by the INS and the rationale for
discounting them applies here. First, the State of Texas in Plyler argued
that it must protect itself from an influx of "illegal" immigrants.
178
170. Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 223 (1982).
171. Id. at 222.
172. Id. at 213.
173. Id. at 222.
174. Id. at 218-19.
175. Id. at 224.
176. S. REP. No. 485, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. (1982) (comments on S. 2222).
177. Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 227 (1982) (citing Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365,
374-75 (1971)).
178. Id. at 228.
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Since the IRCA amnesty program is a one time program, 179 changing the
regulations to meet congressional intent will not result in an influx of
illegal aliens. Second, Texas argued that expanding the government pro-
gram would involve additional administrative costs to the state.
180
Although allowing otherwise qualified amnesty applicants to apply for
amnesty now will cost the INS additional money, had the INS originally
enacted regulations that met the intent of Congress, this would never
have occurred. Eligible amnesty applicants should not suffer due to the
administrative bungling of the INS. Finally, Texas argued that because
of their undocumented status and possible lesser ties to the state, undocu-
mented persons are less likely to remain in the state and, therefore, de-
serve less support from the government.181 As the Supreme Court
acknowledged, however, many undocumented persons do stay in this
country and many attain legal status. 82 These women are not perma-
nently in a class unable to work. In fact, all of the named plaintiffs in
Zambrano have worked when they did not have primary caretaker re-
sponsibility for their young children.8 " It is reasonable to conclude that
once their children are beyond the age of needing full-time care, these
woman will return to work. If they do not receive legal status now, they
will be subject to exploitation in illegal jobs. 84 Whatever their status,
undocumented people continue to contribute to the economy and cul-
tural richness of the United States.
There is no legitimate interest in creating regulations contrary to the
intent of Congress. Additionally, even if the regulations arguably meet
congressional intent, there is no legitimate governmental interest in cre-
ating a statute that discriminates against single women with children.
B. International Treaty Arguments
The United States is a signatory to a number of treaties and human
rights declarations that provide protection to the class of single women
with children who have been denied or discouraged from applying for
immigration amnesty under the IRCA program. Through its misinter-
pretation of the congressional intent.8 5 behind the IRCA and the denial
179. See IRCA, supra note 2, § 201(a) (codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1255a(a)(1)(A) (1988)).
180. Plyler, 457 U.S. at 229.
181. Id. at 230.
182. Id.
183. See Declaration of Marta Zambrano, supra note 77; Declaration of Margarita Rodri-
guez, supra note 11I; Declaration of Martha Ozuna, supra note 77; Declaration of Andrea
Ruiz, supra note 89.
184. See supra notes 116-118 and accompanying text.
185. See supra notes 43-80 and accompanying text.
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of equal protection to single women with children,186 the INS violates
these international treaties.
In addition to violating equal protection rights provided in these
treaties and in the United States Constitution, the INS public charge ex-
clusion regulations clearly violate the equal work rights enunciated in
many international declarations and covenants to which the United
States is a signatory. I87 Women who are denied access to the IRCA am-
nesty do not have the same right to work as other women and men be-
cause work authorization is now required by the IRCA in order to obtain
legal, safe, and decent work.
188
1. The United Nations Convention on the Elimination of All
Forms of Discrimination Against Women
The United Nations Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of
Discrimination Against Women [hereinafter UN Convention] includes
several provisions that implicitly protect the rights of women who have
been denied or discouraged from applying for immigration amnesty
under the IRCA program.'8 9 In its call for equal treatment of women,
the UN Convention parallels the principles underlying the Equal Protec-
tion Clause of the United States Constitution. For example, article 2 of
the Convention states generally that "All appropriate measures shall be
taken to abolish ... regulations ... which are discriminatory against
women."' 90 This applies directly to the PFR regulations that have a de
facto adverse impact on single women with children.
Two articles specifically address the rights of women in immigra-
tion. Article 5 requires that women shall "have the same rights as men
to acquire, change, or retain their nationality. '"' 9' Article 6 reinforces
this directive by stating that women shall have "the same rights as men
with regard to the law on the movement of persons."' 192  However, the
PFR regulations deny single women with children the right that men
186. See supra notes 130-84 and accompanying text.
187. See UNITED NATIONS MULTILATERAL TREATIES DEPOSITED WITH THE SECRE-
TARY GENERAL (1987) [hereinafter MULTILATERAL TREATIES]; supra and infra notes 186-
207 and accompanying text.
188. See supra notes 116-17 and accompanying text.
189. This treaty was signed by the United States on July 17, 1980. As of December 1987, it
had not yet been ratified by the United States Senate. MULTILATERAL TREATIES, supra note
187, at 161.
190. Declaration on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women, G.A. Res. 2263, 22
U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 16) at 35, U.N. Doc. A/6716 (1967) [hereinafter Discrimination
Declaration].
191. Id. art. 5, at 36.
192. Id. art. 6(1)(c).
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have to change their nationality. The regulations also deny them equal-
ity "with regard to the law on the movement of persons."
193
Finally, article 10 calls for governments to ensure women an equal
right to work.1 94 A key provision of the IRCA requires that non-United
States citizens obtain work authorization in order to work legally in the
United States.195 Through the PFR regulations, the INS denies many
single women with children the right to work legally, and therefore, sub-
jects them to a continued need for public assistance or the reliance on
illegal dead-end jobs.
2. The United Nations Universal Declaration of Human Rights
The United Nations Universal Declaration of Human Rights [here-
inafter Universal Declaration] also includes articles that advocate the
equal rights of women and forbid discrimination. Article 2 of the Uni-
versal Declaration includes a blanket provision giving all human beings
equal rights regardless of race, religion, or gender.1 96 Article 7 explicitly
grants "equal protection against any discrimination in violation of this
Declaration." 197 Article 15 deals with immigration rights, stating that
"No one shall be arbitrarily . . . denied the right to change his
nationality."'1 98
Two articles in the Universal Declaration focus on social rights. Ar-
ticle 23 guarantees the right to work,19 9 a right that will be denied if these
otherwise qualified women are not allowed to apply for the IRCA am-
nesty. Article 25 offers special protection to mothers and children, stat-
ing that "[m]otherhood and childhood are entitled to special care and
assistance."'2"o This article supports the idea that mothers deserve spe-
cial consideration in obtaining amnesty.
3. The International Covenant on Economic, Social, and
Cultural Rights
The International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural
Rights "[hereinafter the Covenant], along with the Universal Declaration
193. Id; see also supra notes 71-79 and accompanying text.
194. Discrimination Declaration, supra note 190, art. 10, at 36-37.
195. INA, supra note 3, § 245A(b)(3), amended by IRCA, supra note 2, § 201(a) (codified
as amended at 8 U.S.C. § 1255a(b)(3) (1988)).
196. Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217A, U.N. Doe. A/810, at 71
(1948).
197. Id. art. 7.
198. Id. art. 15(2).
199. Id. art. 23.
200. Id. art. 25(2).
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of Human Rights, is part of the International Bill of Human Rights.2 "1
The Preamble of the Covenant recognizes that "the ideal of free human
beings enjoying freedom from fear and want can only be achieved if con-
ditions are created whereby everyone may enjoy his economic, social and
cultural rights, as well as his [or her] civil and political rights....
Article 6 of the Covenant, mirroring the Convention on the Dis-
crimination Against Women and the Universal Declaration, formally
recognizes the right to work.20 3
Article 7 requires all parties to the Covenant to recognize the rights
of everyone to fair wages, a decent living for themselves and their fami-
lies, and safe and healthy working conditions. 2' This article includes a
phrase that expressly calls for "women [to be] guaranteed conditions of
work not inferior to those enjoyed by men, with equal pay for equal
work. '20 5 The Covenant also includes an article calling on member na-
tions to ensure the realization of "the right of everyone to an adequate
standard of living for himself [or herself] and his [or her] family.
20 6
It is interesting to note that throughout this Covenant, the word
"everyone, '20 7 is used, not "citizen" or "legal person," implying that
these rights apply to every person currently living in a member country.
V. PROPOSALS
The Ninth Circuit should uphold the District Court order invalidat-
ing the PFR regulations that make the public charge exclusion more re-
strictive. The regulations should be declared invalid because they violate
the congressional intent of the IRCA and they seriously undermine the
equal opportunity of single women with children to qualify for the IRCA
amnesty. The two primary culprits are the Proof of Financial Responsi-
bility regulation and the regulation attributing federal benefits received
by United States citizen children to their undocumented parents.
The Ninth Circuit should reverse the District Court decision and
201. UNITED NATIONS, HUMAN RIGHTS: A COMPILATION OF INTERNATIONAL INSTRU-
MENTS, U.N. Doc. ST/HR/1/Rev.2, U.N. Sales No. E.83.XIV.1 (1983).
202. International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights, opened for signa-
ture Dec. 19, 1966, annex, G.A. Res. 2200, 21 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 16) at 49, U.N. Doc.
A/6316 (1966) (preamble) [hereinafter International Covenant].
203. Id. art. 6, at 50. The United States signed this treaty on October 5, 1977. As of
December 1987, it had not been ratified by the United States. MULTILATERAL TREATIES,
supra note 187, at 118.
204. International Covenant, supra note 202, art. 3, at 50.
205. Id. art. 7(a)(i).
206. Id. art. I1(1).
207. See, e.g., id. arts. 6, 7.
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grant a reasonable extension for the filing of legalization applications to
those applicants and potential applicants adversely affected by these reg-
ulations and their interpretations. Thousands of people have been de-
terred from applying because of the inconsistency of the INS position on
the public charge exclusion standard. These potential applicants should
be given a chance to apply and qualify for the IRCA amnesty.
Congress should take additional legislative action to clarify its in-
tended liberal interpretation of the public charge exclusion standard,
thereby bypassing the delays inherent in the continued adjudication of
the present law. Congress should also pass legislation compelling the
INS to institute a program that accurately and sufficiently publicizes the
standards for eligibility under the legalization program. The legislation
could copy Judge Garcia's order and require that the INS work with the
QDEs, district offices, and other community and immigrant's rights or-
ganizations to notify all potentially qualified applicants.
With respect to the public charge exclusion regulation, the INS
should promulgate new regulations for the second stage of the amnesty
program that comply with the liberal intent of Congress. These regula-
tions must establish clear guidelines in order to prevent the ambiguities
and arbitrariness that have plagued the public charge exclusion issue dur-
ing the first stage of the amnesty program.
VI. CONCLUSION
Congress enacted the IRCA's public charge exclusion statute with
two goals in mind. First, Congress wanted to ensure that the new tempo-
rary residents would not become welfare dependent and overburden the
welfare system. Congress was aware, however, that a majority of the
potential applicants were part of the working poor living below the pov-
erty line.2°8 Congress wanted to provide an opportunity for these aliens,
who have contributed so much to the economy of the United States, to
qualify for amnesty. These goals are potentially contradictory and, due
to the action of the INS, have resulted in seriously adverse and discrimi-
natory consequences, especially for potential applicants who are single
women with children.
Congress must afford single women with children the same opportu-
nity to obtain amnesty as other applicants. The PFR regulations exceed
statutory authority and congressional intent and violate the Equal Pro-
tection Clause and numerous international treaties. By denying amnesty
to single women with children, these regulations do not further any goal
208. Wheeler & Zacovic, supra note 11, at 1047.
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of the government and unfairly deny the right to amnesty to single wo-
men with children. Let's give all the "Alicia's" a chance.
